The disjunction effect violates Savage's sure-thing principle: that is, if a is preferred over b regardless of whether relevant outcome x occurs, then a should always be preferred over b [L.J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, New York, Wiley, 1954]. We tested ''reasonbased'' and ''reluctance-to-think'' accounts of the disjunction effect. According to the former account, the disjunction effect occurs when different reasons underlie the preference for a under x versus the preference for a under not x. According to the latter account, the disjunction effect is due to the failure to consider preferences when x is unknown. We tested these accounts by varying the number of reasons underlying choices in the x and not x conditions. Consistent with the reason-based account, when only one reason was available, the disjunction effect was reduced. In addition, we propose a new method of measuring the disjunction effect under different conditions based on the logic proposed by Lambdin and Burdsal (2007) 
Introduction

WON? CHEERS! LOST? CHEER UP!
What time is it? It's football time! These lines are taken from a beer advertising campaign conducted during the English Premier League season (see Today, September 2, 2002; p. 42). The first and the second lines offer good reasons for soccer fans to drink the advertised brand of beer. Whatever the outcome, 1 there is always a good reason to drink beer. This argument raises the following question: If fans do not know whether their team has won or lost, would they choose to drink this brand of beer? Savage [16] suggested that if fans choose to drink beer when their team wins and when it loses, they will also choose to drink beer if the outcome is uncertain. This is referred to as the ''sure-thing principle''. This principle states that, if people prefer a to b knowing that x occurred but also prefer a to b knowing that x did not occur, then they always prefer a to b [16] . In other words, their preference of a over b is independent of their state of knowledge of x.
The sure-thing principle is consistent with basic rational choice. However, Tversky and Shafir [19] showed that people occasionally violate the sure-thing principle when decisions are based on different reasons. These authors asked students whether they would like to spend a vacation in Hawaii under varying states of knowledge of an examination outcome [19] . Students who stated that they preferred to vacation in Hawaii regardless of whether they had passed or failed the examination also stated that they would rather postpone this decision if the outcome was unknown. Tversky and Shafir called this violation of the sure-thing principle the disjunction effect and explained it in terms of ''reason-based'' choice. If they pass the exam, they have one reason to go on vacation -to celebrate. If they fail the exam, they have another reason to go on vacation -to commiserate. However, if they do not know the outcome of the exam, the students now lack a clear reason to go on vacation.
Tversky and Shafir [19] reported another experiment involving a two-step gamble, further supporting reason-based choices. In this study, participants imagined playing a gamble in which they had an equal chance of winning $200 or losing $100. They were then offered an equivalent second gamble under varying states of knowledge of the outcome of the first gamble. Tversky and Shafir found that many participants, who accepted the second gamble both when they knew they had won and when they knew they had lost the first gamble, rejected the second gamble when the outcome was unknown. A similar reason-based account was proposed. If people win the first gamble, then they may accept the second gamble because they still make money even if they lose. Alternatively, people might accept the second gamble to overcome losing the first. Conversely, if people do not know the result of the first gamble, neither reason is relevant; thus, they are less likely to accept it.
Although the reason-based account provides a satisfactory explanation of the disjunction effect, Shafir and Tversky [18] proposed an alternative explanation of the disjunction effect based on a study using the Prisoner's Dilemma. They observed that many participants defected when they knew that their opponent had either defected or cooperated but cooperated when they did not know their opponent's response. Rather than offering a reason-based account, Shafir and Tversky suggested that, under conditions of uncertainty, people do not fully consider all of the relevant branches of a decision tree, which they called ''reluctance-to-think'' account. They suggested that when an outcome is uncertain, participants fail to hypothetically review all the branches of a decision tree and therefore fail to discover that their preferred response does not depend on the outcome in question. Instead, they suspend judgment and remain at the uncertainty node (see Fig. 1 ). Based on this account, Shafir [17] characterized the disjunction effect as participants' unwillingness to think through a decision or game tree (see Fig. 1 ). Shafir argued that this account has implications for decision making, information searches, deductive and inductive reasoning, probabilistic judgments, games, puzzles and paradoxes [17] .
Despite Shafir and Tversky's arguments, the disjunction effect found in the Prisoner's Dilemma task is consistent with the reason-based account. Croson [6] has suggested that a participant has one reason to defect when the counterpart defects (i.e., retribution) and a different reason to defect when the counterpart cooperates (i.e., profit maximization).
Ever since Tversky and Shafir [19] described the disjunction effect and suggested two possible explanations for it, it has attracted considerable interest and has been investigated in numerous theoretical and empirical studies without reaching consensus about its explanation (e.g. [2] [3] [4] 6, [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 17] ). An experiment with eye-tracking [9] provided evidence that manipulating the payoffs of the Prisoner's Dilemma from simple to complex numbers creates the disjunction effect. Thus, the disjunction effect can be attributed to the complexity of decision making. Li et al. [13] used the ''equate-to-differentiate'' approach to explain the disjunction effect after finding that varying the relative difference between ''one's own payoff dimension'' and the ''other's payoff dimension'' changes the likelihood of cooperating in the Prisoner's Dilemma. In addition, Li et al. [14] found that the sure-thing principle was violated in the domain of gains but obeyed in the domain of losses. It is worth noting that, recently, quantum-mechanical principles (or concepts) are developed and applied to resolutely non-quantum settings such as social science (e.g. [1, 5, 7] ), especially in psychology and decision making. Several studies (e.g. [2, 4, 10, 15] ) have used quantum mechanics to explain the disjunction effect. For example, Pothos and Busemeyer [15] A tree diagram illustration for the sure-thing principle. The sure-thing principle implies that, if people prefer a to b knowing that x occurred and also prefers a to b knowing that x did not occur, then they definitely prefer a to b.
as Busemeyer et al. [4] have used one of the most basic concepts of quantum mechanics, probability interference, to aid in explaining violations of the sure-thing principle.
To our knowledge, no research has directly compared the two competing accounts firstly proposed by Tversky and Shafir. Thus, we planned to test them by comparing two different scenarios dealing with the same situation. In one scenario, called the two-reason scenario, there is one reason to choose a over b, when x occurs and another reason to choose a over b when x does not occur. In the alternative scenario, called the one-reason scenario, the same reason is relevant for choosing a over b, both when x occurs and when it does not occur. If the reason-based analysis is correct, the sure-thing principle should be violated only when the problem is presented as a two-reason scenario (i.e., people base their decisions on two different reasons), as this leads to a conflict over which reason to use in the uncertain condition. In contrast, the sure-thing principle should hold when the problem is presented as a one-reason scenario (i.e., people base their decisions on one common reason), as in this case there will be no conflict in the uncertain condition. For example, to foreshadow the first experiment, we replaced beer with mineral water in the situation involving the outcome of a football match, as discussed earlier. We reasoned that the outcome of the football match was irrelevant to the purchase of the mineral water. There was now only one reason to buy the mineral water -to quench thirst. Consequently, according to the reason-based account, the sure-thing principle should hold.
In contrast, if the reluctance-to-think hypothesis is correct, the sure-thing principle should be violated in both one-reason and two-reason scenarios. This is because the form of scenario does not affect the structure of the underlying decision tree (e.g. the number of branches, the number of outcomes of each branch; see Fig. 1 for an illustration). According to this account, the presence of uncertainty makes it harder for people to think through the implications of each outcome since they have to consider both main branches of the tree. Since this is the case in both one-reason and two-reason scenarios, the surething principle should not hold in either scenario.
The aim of the present study is to test which account -reason-based or reluctance-to-think -best explains observed violations of the sure-thing principle. According to the reason-based account, the sure-thing principle should be violated in tworeason scenarios but not in one-reason scenarios. According to the reluctance-to-think account, the sure-thing principle should be violated in both one-reason and two-reason scenarios. In Experiment 1, we created one-reason and two-reason scenarios derived from the ''cheers vs. cheer up'' advertisement mentioned earlier (in Experiments 1a and 1b, respectively). In Experiment 2, we compared one-reason and two-reason scenarios of Tversky and Shafir's two-step gamble and a novel medical decision problem.
Experiment 1a
The aim of this experiment was to determine if the violation of the sure-thing principle occurs in a one-reason scenario. This study was conducted in the context of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and was based on ''cheers vs. cheer up'' advertisement cited earlier. This offers a typical two-reason scenario; winning and losing provide two different reasons for drinking beer. In order to construct a one-reason scenario, we replaced beer with mineral water. In this case, the same reason for drinking mineral water (i.e., to quench thirst) applies whether the team has won or lost. If the reason-based account is correct then this should be sufficient to eliminate the disjunction effect. If the reluctance-to-think account is correct, then a disjunction effect should be observed.
Method
Participants
We surveyed 85 undergraduates and postgraduates on the campus of China Agricultural University in Beijing a few hours before the 2010 FIFA World Cup game between Spain and Paraguay. Because the Chinese national soccer team failed to qualify for the 2010 FIFA World Cup and Spain's national soccer team is one of the most popular teams in China, we chose this match as a relevant scenario. The mean age of participants was 20.0 years.
Procedure
We used a within-participant experimental design in which each participant was asked if they would choose to drink mineral water given (a) that Spain's team won, (b) that Spain's team lost and (c) that they did not know whether that Spain's team had won or lost. The order of these conditions was counterbalanced across participants. Three conditions differed only in the bracketed phrases:
Imagine that while you are watching the match between Spain and Paraguay with your friends, someone comes to you to promote the sale of a very popular brand of mineral water at a very good price.
If you (know that Spain's team won/know that Spain's team lost/do not know whether Spain's team won or lost), how likely is it that you will buy the promoted mineral water? Please indicate your decision by circling a number on a seven-point scale (1 for not at all likely and 7 for very likely).
To ensure that Spain's team was supported by the respondents, we asked them to pick which team -either Spain or Paraguay -they wanted to win the match.
Results and discussion
Confirming our hypothesis, 96.5% of respondents supported Spain. We compared the average ratings across the three conditions (i.e., won, lost and uncertain). We reasoned that the surething principle would be violated if the mean preference in the uncertain condition was less than the mean preference in both certain conditions. We found no evidence of this. Participants' mean rating in the uncertain condition (M = 4.36) fell between the mean rating when they knew that Spain's team had won (M = 4.87) and when they knew that it had lost (M = 3.89). This outcome is consistent with the reason-based account, but with not the reluctance-to-think account.
Experiment 1b
Although we did not find a disjunction effect in Experiment 1a, we did not know whether an equivalent two-reason scenario would also fail to produce a disjunction effect. The aim of Experiment 1b was to test this using the scenario based on the ''cheers vs. cheer up'' advertisement cited earlier. This study was conducted in the context of another football contest, 2 and participants were asked if they would choose to purchase beer under one of three conditions: knowing that their team had won, knowing that it had lost, and not knowing whether it had won or lost. Since there are different reasons to drink beer whether the team has won or lost, this corresponded to a two-reason scenario. If the reason-based account is correct then we expected to observe the disjunction effect. 
Procedure
We administered three versions of the questionnaire, which differed only in the bracketed phrases, to the participants.
The FIFA World Youth Championship for under-20 s was scheduled to kick off in six cities in The Netherlands on June 11, 2005 . This year was the third time that China's youth team had reached the second stage of the FIFA World Youth Championship but the first time they had advanced as the dominant group winners. Imagine that while you are watching the Round of Sixteen match with your friends, someone comes to you to promote the sale of a popular brand of beer. If you (know that China's youth team won/know that China's youth team lost/do not know whether China's youth team won or lost) its Round of Sixteen match, how likely is it that you will buy the promoted beer? Please indicate your decision by circling a number on a seven-point scale (1 for not at all likely and 7 for very likely).
A between-subjects design was used. Approximately one third of the participants were randomly assigned to respond to each of the three versions. No participant responded to more than one version. Data collection took place just two days before the Round of Sixteen, which was scheduled on June 21, 2005.
Results
Consistent with the disjunction effect, the mean likelihood rating in the uncertain condition (M = 3.39) was less than that of the winning (M = 5.14) and losing (M = 3.47) conditions. However, although a one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of condition, (F (2, 298) = 23.95, p < .001), post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between the uncertain and winning conditions (t (199) = 6.12, p < .001) but not between the uncertain and losing conditions (t (198) = 0.28, n.s.). This result is not consistent with either the reason-based or reluctance-to-think accounts.
Discussion
Experiment 1 failed to show a violation of the sure-thing principle in either one-or two-reason scenarios; however, the analysis of these results relied on a simple comparison of mean likelihood ratings. Although this method is commonly used to define the disjunction effect (e.g. [6, 11, 18, 19] ), Lambdin and Burdsal [12] have strongly criticized it. In their original paper, Tversky and Shafir [19] did not propose a single method to measure the disjunction effect and employed a descriptive rather than an operational definition. That is, they simply compared the proportion of those who accepted option a across the three conditions (i.e., certain x, certain not x, and uncertain x) and observed that a sizeable number of participants selected an inconsistent series of choices -accepting option a under certain x and certain not x but rejecting this option under uncertain x. Given this, researchers have employed several different methods to quantify the disjunction effect. For example, Bagassi and Macchi [3] measured the disjunction effect in terms of the difference between the uncertain condition and mean of the two certain conditions. Alternatively, Kühberger et al. [11] compared the uncertain condition to both the certain x and certain not x conditions separately. Using the latter method, a disjunction effect occurs if preferences in the uncertain condition fall (significantly) beyond the limits defined by the two certain conditions. These approaches do not necessarily yield the same results. For example, although Bagassi and Macchi found a disjunction effect, it disappears when the method of Küh-berger et al. is applied to their data (v 2 = 1.02, p = .31).
Lambdin and Burdsal [12] argued that comparisons between groups of participants do not create the necessary conditions for a disjunction effect. Instead, the same participant should be asked each of three questions (i.e., x, not x and x is unknown). A disjunction effect occurs when the choice in the uncertain condition is inconsistent with the choices made in both certain conditions. That is, a participant who chooses a in both x and not x conditions violates the sure-thing principle and demonstrates the disjunction effect when they do not choose a when x is uncertain. Alternatively, participants who choose a in either x or not x conditions cannot violate the sure-thing principle regardless of their choice in the uncertain condition. In addition, Lambdin and Burdsal [12] showed that a violation of the sure-thing principle at the individual level may or may not yield a disjunction effect at the group level. Therefore, group comparison is not the appropriate level of analysis.
Lambdin and Burdsal's logic is compelling; indeed, it can be extended in two ways. First, note that given a choice between two options, a and not a (e.g. buying beer vs. not buying beer), a participant can be inconsistent in one of two different ways. They may choose a in both certain conditions and choose not a in the uncertain condition. This is the scenario considered by Lambdin and Burdsal [12] . Alternatively, they may choose not a in both certain conditions and choose a in the uncertain condition. This also demonstrates a violation of the sure-thing principle, since a and not a are both options that may or may not be preferred.
Second, although most studies on the disjunction effect use a binary choice format to investigate participant preference (e.g. [3, 6, 11, 12, 18, 19] ), the logic of consistency can be extended to the rating scale used in the present study. Using a binary choice format, there are 8 (i.e., 2
3 ) possible response patterns: 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, and 111, where 0 denotes choosing not a (e.g. not buying beer), and 1 denotes choosing a (e.g. buying beer). The digit places represent certain x (e.g. the team has won), certain not x (e.g. the team has lost) and uncertain x (e.g. not knowing the team has won or lost). Of eight response patterns, only two (25%; 001 and 110) violate the sure-thing principle. One advantage of using a 7-point rating scale, as in the present set of experiments, is that the number of different response outcomes and the number of ways in which the sure-thing principle can be violated greatly increase. There are 343 (i.e., 7 3 ) response patterns for a 7-point rating scale. There are also proportionately more ways to violate the sure-thing principle. For example, suppose that a participant in the x condition rates their preference for a as 5 and their preference in the not x condition as 3. The participant would be consistent if they rated their preference for a in the uncertain x condition as 3, 4, or 5. Any other response would be inconsistent and violate the sure-thing principle. More generally, let R a (x), R a (not x), and R a (uncertain x), be the preference ratings for option a under certain x, certain not x, and uncertain x, respectively. Let L = min(R a (x), R a (not x)) be the smaller rating in the two certain conditions and let M = max(R a (x), R a (not x)) be the larger rating in the two certain conditions. Thus, people are consistent and do not violate the sure-thing principle when L 6 R a (uncertain x) 6 M; conversely, people are inconsistent and violate this principle whenever R a (uncertain x) < L or R a (uncertain x) > M. Of the 343 possible response patterns, 182 (53%) violate the sure-thing principle. Thus, multi-point rating scales offer a sensitive way to measure changes in the disjunction effect across experimental conditions. 3 Based on these arguments, we employed a within-participant design in the following experiment and compared two methods of detecting a disjunction effect: (1) the comparison of mean preference ratings across three conditions used in Experiment 1, and (2) the measurement of the proportion of individual violations of the sure-thing principle. Both methods compared the size of the disjunction effect between the one-reason and two-reason scenarios. In Experiment 2, we employed two different problems-the two-step gamble problem used by Tversky and Shafir [19] and a novel medical decision.
Experiment 2
The two-step gamble problem has been used in several disjunction effect studies (e.g. [3, 11, 12, 19] ) and corresponds to the two-reason scenario. To generate a one-reason scenario for this problem, we substituted the second gamble with the option of buying a lottery ticket at a discounted price of $2. We reasoned that the outcome of the first gamble was irrelevant to the purchase of this lottery ticket. The only reason to buy the ticket was the chance to win an abundance of money at a negligible cost.
The two reasons in the original two-step gamble problem might still be applicable in this one-reason scenario; that is, if people win $200 in the first gamble, the subsequent loss of $2 to buy a lottery ticket will still leave them ahead. If people lose $100 in the first gamble, the lottery ticket offers them the chance to get out of the red. Thus, we designed a second problem to make the difference between the one-reason and two-reason scenarios more clear. In the HIV problem, participants imagined that they underwent a blood transfusion following a car accident in a country with a high prevalence of HIV. Upon returning home, their doctor suspects that they may have contracted HIV. The doctor proposes a blood test to confirm his supposition. We asked participants whether they would tell their doctor about their previous blood transfusion (i.e., one-reason scenario) or their family (i.e., two-reason scenario).
In the one-reason scenario, participants were asked if they would tell their doctor about the transfusion when they are certain that they have HIV, when they are certain they do not have HIV, and when they do not know if they have HIV. We reasoned that their knowledge of their HIV status is irrelevant to their decision to tell the doctor. The only reason in play was to ensure that the doctor had all of the relevant medical facts. In contrast, different reasons come into play when considering telling one's family. If the participant is certain that they have HIV, then one reason to tell the family would be to explain how this had happened. Alternatively, if the participant is certain that they do not have HIV, they might tell their family in order to reassure them that they are all right.
Although we attempted to distinguish between the one-reason and two-reason scenarios as much as possible, we also decided to conduct a manipulation check in one group of participants. This group provided reasons for their choices under each condition (i.e., certain x, certain not x and uncertain x). If the manipulation was successful, then these reasons should be more similar across conditions in the one-reason scenario compared to the two-reason scenario. Following participants' response in the uncertain condition, they rated the extent to which they considered the implications of the x and not x conditions as a direct test of the reluctance-to-think account, which proposes that such implications are not considered in the uncertain condition. Participants also rated the extent to which they believed they had a clear reason for their choice in the uncertain condition as a direct test of the reason-based account, which proposes that participants do not have clear reasons to choose the option they preferred in the two certain conditions.
Method
Participants
We recruited 255 postgraduates and undergraduates (99 females and 156 males; mean age = 23.8 years) from China and Singapore for this experiment. Ninety five participants were recruited from various disciplines at the Chinese Academic Sciences in Beijing and given a small gift for their participation. The other participants were from various disciplines at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and volunteered their time.
Procedure
Tversky and Shafir's two-step gamble and the novel HIV problem were presented to the participants in a questionnaire format. Singaporean participants received instructions in English, and Chinese participants received instructions in Mandarin. In each questionnaire, the participants circled a number on a 7-point scale to indicate the likelihood of their behavior for all three decision situations (1 for not at all likely and 7 for very likely). The Chinese participants answered additional manipulation check questions (see below).
Shafir and Tversky's two-step gamble
The original two-step gamble problem formed the two-reason scenario in the present experiment and consisted of the following instructions. We presented the underlined questions only to Chinese participants.
Imagine that you have just tossed a coin that gave you a 50% chance of winning $200 and a 50% chance of losing $100. You are now offered a second coin toss with the same possible result. The one-reason scenario questions were identical to those above, except the sentence ''You are now offered a second coin toss with the same possible result'' was replaced with ''You are now offered a chance to buy a lottery ticket at a discounted price of $2''.
HIV Problem
The two-reason scenario was as follows: You are in a car accident while on an overseas trip to a country with a high prevalence of HIV and undergo a blood transfusion. Upon returning to your own country for a thorough medical check-up, your doctor suspects that you have HIV. Your doctor wants you to undergo another blood test to confirm his supposition.
(1) If you do not know your HIV status, how likely is it that you will tell your family about the blood transfusion? (2) If you know that you do not have HIV, how likely is it that you will tell your family about the blood transfusion? (3) If you know that you have HIV, how likely is it that you will tell your family about the blood transfusion?
We presented the same manipulation check questions to the Chinese sample as in the two-step gamble (questions not shown).
The one-reason scenario was the same as the two-reason scenario except that the word ''doctor'' replaced the word ''family''.
We presented all participants with one scenario of the two-step gamble and the HIV problem. We provided half of the participants in each sample (i.e., Chinese and Singaporean) with the one-reason scenario of the two-step gamble and the two-reason scenario of the HIV problem. We provided the other half of the participants with the alternative scenarios. We counterbalanced the presentation order of each problem and the three questions within each problem across participants.
Results
There were no differences between the Chinese and Singaporean participants. Thus, we collapsed across these subgroups for all additional analyses.
4.2.1. Two-step gamble 4.2.1.1. Mean likelihood ratings. Two-reason scenario. A one-way ANOVA found that participants claimed to be more likely to accept the second gamble when they knew they had won the first gamble (M = 4.81) than when they knew they had lost the first gamble (M = 3.63) or when the outcome was unknown (M = 3.61; F (2, 252) = 19.23, p < .001). However, a within-participant contrast did not find a significant difference between the uncertain condition and the losing condition (t (126) = .09, n.s.). According to this analysis, participants did not violate the sure-thing principle.
One-reason scenario. Participants' likelihood of accepting the second gamble in the uncertain condition (M = 4.34) was less than the likelihood of the winning condition (M = 5.08) and greater than the losing condition (M = 3.85). Again, these data do not violate the sure-thing principle.
Within-participant analysis.
A within-participants analysis of the data revealed that 26 out of 128 participants were inconsistent and violated the sure-thing principle in the one-reason scenario, and 46 out of 127 participants were inconsistent in the two-reason scenario. This difference was significant (v 2 = 8.20, p < .001) and demonstrates a larger disjunction effect in the in the two-reason scenario, which is consistent with the reason-based account.
4.2.2. HIV problem 4.2.2.1. Mean likelihood ratings. Two-reason scenario. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences in mean ratings across the three decision situations (F (2, 252) = 23.41, p < .001). Pairwise comparisons showed that the mean rating in the uncertain condition (M = 4.21) was significantly less than the mean rating in the positive condition (M = 5.56, t (127) = 7.24, p < .001) and the negative condition (M = 4.83, t (127) = 3.49, p < .001). These data demonstrate a disjunction effect.
One-reason scenario. The mean rating in the uncertain condition (M = 6.44) was less than the mean rating for the positive condition (M = 6.65) and greater than the negative condition (M = 6.10). These data do not demonstrate a disjunction effect.
4.2.2.2.
Within-participant analysis. Overall, 10 out of 127 participants were inconsistent in the one-reason scenario, and 36 out of 128 were inconsistent in the two-reason scenario. This difference was significant (v 2 = 19.07, p < .001) and demonstrates a larger disjunction effect in the two-reason scenario than in the one-reason scenario, which is consistent with the reason-based account.
All data
We collapsed the data across the problem types to analyze all of the data. One-reason scenario. Participants' mean rating in the uncertain condition (M = 5.39) was less than the mean rating of the x condition and greater than the mean rating of the not x condition (M = 5.86 and 4.97, respectively). Based on this analysis, these data do not demonstrate a disjunction effect. Two independent coders judged the similarity of the reasons that participants provided in the two certainty conditions. They used a 6-point rating scale (1 for completely different and 6 for completely the same). Rater judgment was consistent (r = 0.813, p < .001); thus, we averaged their scores.
Reason similarity was higher in the one-reason scenario (M = 3.94 and 4.83 for two-step gamble and HIV problems, respectively) compared to the two-reason scenario (M = 3.09 and 3.33, respectively). Both differences were significant (two-step gamble: t (92) = 2.39, p < .05; HIV problem: t (92) = 4.46, p < .001).
Consideration of possible outcomes.
The reluctance-to-think account proposes that in situations of uncertainty, people do not consider their preferences along the two certain paths of the decision tree. We tested this account by asking participants to rate whether they considered the implications of the possible outcomes on a 6-point scale (1 for did not consider completely; 6 for considered completely). The mean of these ratings in the one-reason scenario were 4.15 and 4.85 for the two-step gamble and HIV problems, respectively. Mean agreement in the two-reason scenario was 4.53 and 4.29 for the twostep gamble and HIV problems, respectively. We did not find significant differences between the scenarios for either problem. Although these results are consistent with the reluctance-to-think account, the relatively high ratings (overall M = 4.46) suggest that participants had no difficulty considering the implications of the possible outcomes in the uncertain condition.
Decision reasons.
We also asked participants if they had clear reasons for their choice in the uncertain condition. The reason-based account suggests that while participants should be confident of having a reason in the one-reason scenario, they may be less confident in the two-reason scenario. For the two-step gamble problem, the mean agreement rating was 4.56 for the one-reason scenario and 5.04 for the two-reason scenario; t (93) = 1.98, n.s. With regard to the HIV problem, the mean agreement was 4.79 and 4.44 for the one-reason and two-reason scenarios, respectively. Although these results are in the expected direction, they were not significant (t (93) = 1.20, n.s.). These results do not support the view that participants are less able to identify reasons for their behavior in the uncertain condition of the two-reason scenario.
Discussion
The reason-based account predicts larger disjunction effects (i.e., more violations of the sure-thing principle) in two-reason compared to one-reason scenarios. Consistent with this prediction, we found that the disjunction effect increased when participants based their preferences on two different reasons given their certain knowledge of a relevant outcome. This result was most apparent in the HIV problem, although we also observed it in Tversky and Shafir's two-step gamble problem. In the latter case, although there were no differences in mean preference ratings, a difference was observed using the withinparticipant analysis proposed by Lambdin and Burdsal [12] . Although it is only possible to observe differences in the size of the disjunction effect between conditions using this method, the current results suggest that this method is more sensitive to such changes than analysis of overall means.
We also examined the implications of these two accounts on participants' reports of their reasons for their decisions. Contrary to the reluctance-to-think account, participants' reports suggested that they were aware of and considered the implications of the branches of the decision tree corresponding to the certain x and certain not x conditions. Furthermore, participants reported that they had reasons for their choices in the uncertain condition. Contrary to a simple interpretation of the reason-based account, participants thought that they had reasons for their choices in this condition.
General discussion
The present study tested two competing accounts of the disjunction effect: the reason-based account [19] and the reluctance-to-think account [18] . In the present two experiments, we found that uncertainty alone is not a sufficient condition for the disjunction effect. Rather, two different reasons under two certain conditions seem to be necessary. We, however, do not know how people generated a reason to prefer not a in the disjunctive condition, given that they generated reasons to prefer a in the two certain conditions. There may be several possible explanations. One explanation is that in uncertain conditions, neither reason favoring a is apparent and people turn to prefer not a. However, this explanation is not consistent with the results of manipulation check questions that people did not think that they had no clear reasons for decisions in uncertain conditions. A second explanation is that when people face two different reasons to prefer a in uncertain conditions, they will be in a conflict, and avoid preferring a. In this case, they will stop searching for another reason for preferring a; instead, they will choose to prefer not a and fabricate reasons for their decisions, because every choice has a reason. This explanation is more plausible because it is consistent with the manipulation check results (i.e., people have thought of implications of disjunctive outcomes and had clear reasons for their decisions). Hogarth and Kunreuther [8] suggested that, without adequate information, people generate rationales or arguments that allow them to resolve conflicts and make decisions. The disjunction effect occurred because the reasons for preferring not a in the disjunctive condition differed from those for preferring a in the two certain conditions. As our participants reported, their reasons for preferring not a in the two-reason scenarios of the disjunctive condition included, ''I do not want my family to worry about me'' in the HIV problem and ''I do not like uncertainty'' or ''Gambling once is enough'' in the two-step gamble problem.
It might be argued that the reluctance-to-think and reason-based accounts are not separate explanations, but two parts of a complete argument. Decision makers are reluctant to think through the nodes of a decision tree under uncertainty, and thus they lack a clear reason for each choice. Our data, however, do not support this argument. The participants reported that, in both one-reason and two-reason scenarios, they thought through the disjunctions in the uncertain conditions and had a clear reason for the decisions they made.
The disjunction effect can be, and has been, measured in several different ways. We contrasted two approaches -one based on comparisons of means across participants and one based on a within-participant analysis, as recommended by Lambdin and Burdsal [12] . The former approach has two advantages: it can be calculated using different groups of participants, each given one of the critical questions, and it provides an absolute measure of the disjunction effect. That is, it is possible to conclude that a disjunction effect did or did not occur in any one condition. It also has two disadvantages. First, as Lambdin and Burdsal noted, it is possible for violations of the sure-thing principle to occur at an individual level and for this not to be apparent at the level of group means. Second, as shown in the present study, it is a relatively insensitive measure. In contrast, although the within-participant method only provides a relative measure of the disjunction effect -it can only show that the size of the effect has changed between scenarios -it is both a relatively more sensitive and logically valid approach.
Our application of the within-participant method introduced two innovations that may have increased its sensitivity. First, we identified two forms of choice inconsistency that represent violations of the sure-thing principle. Second, using a multi-point rating scale increased the number of ways in which a participant could reveal an inconsistent preference.
In conclusion, the present results support Tversky and Shafir's [19] view that the disjunction effect occurs because people have one reason to prefer an option when a relevant outcome occurs and another reason to prefer the same option when a relevant outcome does not occur.
